Chairman McCaul discusses his recent bipartisan congressional trip to France, Poland, Estonia, and Ukraine to examine cybersecurity issues, and how the United States can continue to support European partners while also learning from their experiences to bolster U.S. homeland security.
There’s a lot we know—and even more we don’t know—regarding the Kremlin interference in the U.S. election last year. The most important thing we know is that there was interference. This is the consensus, “high confidence” assessment of the U.S. intelligence community, which further concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin was trying to hurt Hillary Clinton and help Donald Trump. That in and of itself is scandalous enough. What we don’t know—and need to find out—is whether the Trump campaign actively colluded with this Russian operation and, more broadly, what links if any exist between the U.S. president and the dictator in the Kremlin.
Carrying out a cyberattack that successfully disrupts grid operations would be extremely difficult but not impossible. The United States should take measures to prevent a cyberattack on its power grid and mitigate the potential harm should preventive efforts fail.
In an election decided by just 70,000 votes in three states, it is hard to dismiss the possibility that the Russian intervention could, in fact, have tilted the outcome. That would make this the most consequential computer hack in history, but was it an act of war?
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 2, 2017, Matthew C. Waxman addressed some of the international law questions most relevant to cyber threats and U.S. strategy and made recommendations for U.S. leadership in the evolution of related international rules. Waxman argued that even though international law regarding cyber capabilities is not yet settled, existing rules can support a strong cyber defense strategy. Since many of the international law questions depend on specific, case-by-case facts, and are likely to be highly contested for a long time to come, the United States should continue to advance interpretations that support its strategic interests and effectively constrain other states’ behavior.
Cyberspace is a largely ungoverned domain with a growing threat of disruptive acts. In the absence of a cyber regulatory regime, the United States must strengthen deterrence and bolster its resilience, writes CFR President Richard N. Haass.
Over the course of the next four years, President Donald Trump’s administration will likely have to contend with Russian influence operations, Chinese cyber espionage, Iranian subterfuge, fights over appropriate use of encryption, data localization, and attracting technical talent to protect U.S. networks. Successfully meeting these challenges will require policy changes and deft maneuvering, write CFR's Alex Grigsby and Adam Segal.
Cyber threats are escalating in sophistication and magnitude, but mistrust between Washington and Silicon Valley continues to stymie progress on cybersecurity. In a new Council Special Report, Adam Segal examines the security risks exacerbated by the divide between government and the technology community and offers policy recommendations to help restore trust.
Since the Snowden disclosures in 2013, the relationship between the U.S. government and the tech community has been strained. This Council Special Report offers recommendations for repairing the relationship and moving forward on issues such as encryption, data localization, and cybersecurity.
The Trump team should no doubt develop their own strategy for securing the nation in cyberspace but, in doing so, they should build off of the many successes and lessons learned from Obama’s eight years in grappling with these issues, writes Rob Knake.
After Russia’s hacking to influence November’s election, Rob Knake argues that we should expect to see Russia use its cyber exploitation capabilities against the U.S. for even darker and more frightening purposes in the year ahead.
Last week’s rollout of new sanctions against Russia by the Obama administration answered many questions about Moscow’s alleged hacking activities. But it didn’t address one crucial question, writes Stephen Sestanovich.
As reports increasingly indicate that Russia interfered with the U.S. presidential election to benefit Donald Trump, the president-elect has forcefully pushed back on the intelligence community. Admitting that Moscow played a role in the election, Trump believes, would delegitimize his victory, so he has doubled down on his position that Russia was not involved in the hacks on Democratic Party officials, writes Robert Knake.
Learn more about CFR’s mission and its work over the past year in the 2016 Annual Report. The Annual Report spotlights new initiatives, high-profile events, and authoritative scholarship from CFR experts, and includes a message from CFR President Richard N. Haass. Read and download »